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1 Introduction
When buying a complex financial investment product (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a; Brown and
Minor, 2012), deciding whether to undergo a surgery, or approving a mechanic’s choice of an
auto part for replacement (Wolinsky, 1993; Emons, 1997), consumers usually lack the necessary
expertise to fully assess the quality of the product or service they are receiving. Such goods for
which consumers cannot assess the value of the attributes with certainty are referred to as “credence
goods” (Darby and Karni, 1973; Wolinsky, 1993). Credence goods differ from other types of goods in
two ways. First, unlike experience goods, the true quality of a credence good may remain unknown
to consumers even after purchase and consumption. For instance, a patient is unlikely to assess
the true quality of a surgery she underwent, even after the surgery. Second, during the process of
purchasing a credence good, consumers may rely on observable signals and advice provided by sellers
due to their inability to assess product quality on their own. Sellers (i.e., retailers) typically have
the knowledge and expertise about the products they offer and can better judge the true quality of
a product relative to the consumer. For credence goods, therefore, retailers act not only as a point
of sale, but also as the information intermediary between a manufacturer and a consumer. As an
information intermediary, the retailer, in addition to providing the product or service itself, also
provides the information signal regarding the product’s quality. Thus, there exists an information
asymmetry between the seller and consumers. Crucially, the information asymmetry may result
in a moral hazard problem (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006): An opportunistic seller may present
a low-quality product to consumers as a high-quality product to increase consumer’s willingness
to pay, or, may undersell a high-quality product to lower consumers’ expectations about product
quality.
Examples of misrepresentation abound. In retail, gourmet food products and healthcare prod-
ucts may sometimes be sold with deceptive labels1 (Martinez, 2009). Body care products that are
not truly organic, for instance, are misrepresented as “organic” (The Gourmet Retailer, 2012). The
National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) estimates “tens of billions of dollars each
year are lost” due to health care providers selling unnecessary procedures (NHCAA, 2014). When
buying home-remodeling products such as windows and doors, consumers are frequently warned
1For example, in 2006-7, over 3.2 million liters of olive oil were sold in Italy via misrepresentation that it was
produced in Italy (versus packaged in Italy) and that it was pure extra virgin (versus a blend).
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to beware of companies misrepresenting low-quality products as high-end and reliable ones.2 In a
similar vein, one contributing factor to the financial crisis in 2008 was misrepresentation of invest-
ment quality and the risk associated with financial products by investment advisors (Inderst and
Ottaviani, 2012a).
Although misrepresentation affects manufacturers, retailers, and consumers at large, the con-
ditions which give rise to it are grossly understudied in marketing. This paper addresses the issue
of misrepresentation of credence goods in a vertical distribution channel, focusing on several im-
portant questions: First, what are the conditions that promote misrepresentation behavior among
partners in a vertical channel? Specifically, does misrepresentation always arise due to the fault of
one party, or is it a joint outcome emanating from a double moral hazard present in the channel?
Second, how does the the manufacturer’s choice of channel design affect the retailer’s incentives for
misrepresentation of the product’s true quality? Specifically, are there any incentives for a manu-
facturer to choose an exclusive versus non-exclusive distribution channel to mitigate moral hazard?
Third, and finally, how does the attribution of blame for quality problems to retailer influence the
retailer’s incentives to misrepresent product quality?
We address these questions by developing a stylized model of a vertical channel where the
manufacturer sells its product via one or more retailers. The manufacturer can produce either a
high or a low-quality product, and the retailers examine it in order to form their beliefs about
product quality. Depending on the outcome of this examination and the wholesale prices set
by the manufacturer, the retailers then decide whether or not to misrepresent product quality.
Consumers make their purchase decisions based on the product quality signaled by the retailers
and the retail prices. Following the tradition of papers analyzing credence goods (Kartik et al.,
2007), the consumers in our model recognize the incentives of the sellers to misrepresent products;
however, since consumers are unable to detect if a seller is truthful or not, they act credulously. If
the product fails, consumers punish their source of quality perceptions, the retailer.
Our investigation provides several counter-intuitive, but theoretically relevant insights. First,
instances of misrepresentation arise as a joint outcome of the decisions made by the retailers and
manufacturers. Although retailers have full control on influencing consumer perceptions of quality,
the manufacturer may also benefit when retailers misrepresents the quality of his product. As a re-
2See http : //web.aces.uiuc.edu/vista/pdf pubs/RPRFRAUD.PDF , accessed on 4-1-2014.
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sult, the manufacturer may make quality and pricing choices to encourage misrepresentation by the
retailer. Second, many manufacturers believe that vertically integrating retailers is the only strat-
egy available to reduce misrepresentation (Minder, 2014). Our model compares the single retailer
and multiple retailer scenarios to ascertain their effect on the extent of product misrepresentation
in the marketplace. The findings propose an alternative mechanism: Having multiple retailers can
mitigate strategic misrepresentation of product quality. This is due to a market correcting effect
of partnering with multiple downstream players: consumers’ ability to compare quality signals
from multiple retailers helps them to update beliefs about the true quality of a product. For a
high quality manufacturer, increasing the credibility of the quality signals eliminates part of the
informational inefficiencies present in credence goods markets. This, in return, may help channel
members to improve their profits. Thus, contrary to lay intuition, increasing the number of retailers
may, in some cases, increase the total profitability across retailers despite enhanced competition.
The extensions of a benchmark model provide some additional insights. First, we show that
misrepresentation rises regardless of who gets blamed: A proportional distribution of blame of
quality problems to the retailers and the manufacturer does not eliminate this outcome. Second, the
assumption of credulity is relaxed to examine the impact of consumer skepticism on the incentives to
misrepresent and the channel profits. One might think that if consumers can recognize and account
for retailers’ incentives to misrepresent a low-quality product as being a high-quality product, the
extent of such misrepresentation will be reduced. However, we demonstrate that this is not always
the case; in fact, the overall effect of consumer skepticism depends on how low the product quality
is. Third, we allow the retailer representation of quality to be fully strategic by eliminating any
unintended misrepresentation outcomes. Even though in this case the retailer openly misleads
consumers, misrepresentation – surprisingly – is not fully eliminated.
Although the literature on misrepresentation dates back to the 1970s (Akerlof, 1970), to our
knowledge, this is the first paper in marketing to examine the relationship between misrepresen-
tation and channel structure using an analytical modeling framework. Misrepresentation received
heightened attention following the 2008 financial crisis (e.g., Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b), Brown
and Minor (2012), Inderst and Ottaviani (2013)). Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) consider costless
communication between sellers and credulous buyers in tradition with cheap-talk models (Crawford
and Sobel (1982)). These authors find that refund policies can discipline an opportunistic seller. In
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Mishra et al. (1998), the information asymmetry between sellers and buyers is explicitly considered
in selling environments. Using data from service managers in the automotive industry, the authors
confirm that institutional differences among retail outlets change the extent to which consumers
suffer from moral hazard. The study provides a comprehensive summary of factors impacting seller
moral hazard including local vs. national store ownership, number of employees, seller compensa-
tion and company culture but does not focus on channel design as a factor moderating the extent
of moral hazard. We contribute to these earlier studies in several ways. First, whereas most of the
earlier models focus on the seller and consumer relationship, we bring attention to the potential
conflict between the manufacturer’s and retailer’s incentives to misrepresent to consumers in a ver-
tical channel design. Thus, our model considers manufacturers, retailers, and consumers as opposed
to only a seller (manufacturer or retailer) and consumers. In our model, the manufacturer has the
power to set product quality, whereas the seller has the power to shape customers’ beliefs about
quality. Further, in our model signals sent can have costly consequences for consumers, sellers, and
manufacturers, whereas most earlier papers assume no direct cost of misrepresentation. Our study
therefore extends and complements the findings of these earlier works.
Our work also contributes to the literature concerning customer satisfaction (Oliver, 1997) and
customer attribution of failure (Zeithaml (1988); Folkes (1988); Tsiros et al. (2004); Johnson and
Folkes (2007)). Most of the earlier works on customer satisfaction make an assumption that setting
customer expectations low will always be beneficial for profits because it should lead to higher
customer satisfaction (performance exceeds customer expectations). We theoretically identify situ-
ations when the opposite effect might occur: selling a high-quality product under the guise of lower
quality can decrease the profits of channel members.
Further, behavioral theorists have examined failure attribution processes by consumers (Tsiros
et al., 2004; Folkes et al., 1987), yet they do not consider the strategic implications of this attribution
for both manufacturers and sellers. In this paper we study how the attribution of blame for product
failure is distributed between the manufacturer and retailers, and how this distribution affects their
strategies and profits. Similarly, there is a large body of empirical research examining the nature of
redress (after the product failure occurred) that consumers may seek based on failure attributions
(Smith et al., 1999; Francken, 1983). These studies mainly focus on strategies for management
of post-purchase consumer dissatisfaction, but do not attempt to address the source of discontent
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based on channel relationship conflicts.
Finally, our study contributes to the B2B literature on channel design (McGuire and Staelin
(1983)), and on aligning manufacturer and retailer incentives (e.g. Jeuland and Shugan (1983);
Coughlan (1985); Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986); Moorthy (1988); Purohit and Staelin (1994); Lee
and Staelin (1997); Kim and Staelin (1999)). Most B2B relationships - especially those between
manufacturers and retailers - are based on the exchange of credence goods (Jacques (2007), Grewal
and Lilien (2012)) and misrepresentation is a common reason for conflict in B2B relationships
(Phillips, 1974). Three studies that are closely linked to ours are Chu and Desai (1995) and Mishra
et al. (1998). In Chu and Desai (1995), authors focus on manufacturer incentives to retailers in the
form of customer satisfaction assistance and consumer-satisfaction-index bonus to ensure positive
customer outcomes, namely their satisfaction with the product. Similarly, Hauser et al. (1994)
examines how firms can design incentive systems to improve customer satisfaction. Consistent
with the spirit of these studies, we assume that consumer dissatisfaction with the product quality
and the misrepresentation can have costly consequences for the channel members. Using this
assumption, we examine how manufacturers can use channel design as a tool to mitigate quality
misrepresentation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section ?? we review the relevant literature
to situate our model. Section 2 develops the model and in Section 3 we compare a design with
single and multiple retailers in a channel; we also examine issues related to consumer welfare. In
Section 4 we extend our model in several directions: we consider a scenario when the upstream
member offers a menu of prices, we analyze the cases when only one of the channel members is
punished by the consumer for misleading, and relax some of the assumptions we make in Section 2.
Finally, we develop some managerial implications and conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
Consider a channel where several downstream firms are selling the product to consumers. They
obtain the product from an upstream monopolist. We will call the downstream firms the “retail-
ers”, and the upstream firm the “manufacturer” and refer to the retailers with ‘she’ and to the
manufacturer with ‘he’ to help the reader follow our exposition.
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The manufacturer (denoted with M) can choose to distribute the product via one or several
retailers. The number of downstream channel members is the comparative statics parameter in our
paper: we first present a benchmark model where there is a single retailer (denoted with R) selling a
product to consumers. Within the single retailer framework, we determine the equilibrium product
quality and wholesale prices chosen by the manufacturer, as well as the product representation
strategies and retail prices set by the retailer. Subsequently, we consider a dual retailer distribution
channel design, where manufacturer sells its product via two retailers (denoted by R1 and R2
respectively). We compare the manufacturer’s profits and equilibrium strategies in the two channel
designs, as well as the retailer’s choice of quality representation strategy.
2.1 The Manufacturer
There are two distinct decisions that the manufacturer makes. First, the manufacturer sets the
quality of the product (qM ) by choosing from two predetermined levels of quality: high (H) or low
(L). Second, he sets the wholesale price of the product, w. The difference between quality levels is
that the low-quality product can fail (after the purchase) with probability r, while the high-quality
product never fails. Additionally, the manufacturer faces higher marginal cost of production (cH)
for a high-quality product than when he produces a low-quality product at a cost cL: cL < cH .
We assume that the product quality is manufacturer’s private information and cannot be ob-
served by either retailers or consumers. Further, we assume that the failure rate of a low-quality
product, r, is common knowledge, while production costs cL and cH are unknown to retailers or
consumers.
2.2 The Retailers
Consistent with the notion of credence goods (e.g., Emons (1997)) consumers cannot judge the
quality of the product on their own. That is why there is a need for retailers in the market: not
only do the retailers serve as a point of sale, but they also signal product quality to consumers.
Since the true product quality is manufacturer’s private information, the retailer must first examine
the product to form her opinion about its quality before the retailer can signal the product quality
to consumers. For example, the retailer’s examination may rely on experts or on product reviews, or
retailer may run tests to form an opinion about product quality. The outcome of this examination
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depends on the actual product quality, qM , as well as on the precision of the examination technology.
Let qt ∈ {H,L} denote the retailer’s opinion about product quality formed as a result of product
examination. Let γ ∈ (0.5, 1) represent the precision of the product examination process, where γ
is defined as follows:
γ = P (qt = H|qM = H) = P (qt = L|qM = L), (1)
Definition (1) suggests that the retailer has imperfect ability to detect the true quality of the
product, which means that with probability (1− γ) she will believe the product is of high quality
whereas the true product quality is low and vice versa.3 We assume γ > 0.5 so that a retailer can
use the examination technology credibly. Furthermore, we assume that γ is common knowledge.
Upon product examination, the retailer sends a quality signal qR ∈ {L,H} to consumers.
Retailer’s signal can match or differ from her opinion on the product quality. We refer to the
quality signal qR sent to consumers conditional on the retailer’s opinion qt, as the “representation
strategy” of the retailer. There are four possible representation strategies:
(1) “Truthful” (T ): send a high (low) quality signal for a product whenever retailer believes it is
of high (low) quality, i.e., qR = qt;
(2) “Overselling” (O): send a high quality signal regardless of the opinion on the product quality,
i.e., qR = H for both qt = H and qt = L;
(3) “Underselling” (U): send a low quality signal regardless of the opinion on the product quality,
i.e., qR = L for both qt = H and qt = L;
(4) “Mismatching” (MM): send a high (low) quality signal for a product that retailer believes
is of low (high) quality, i.e., qR 6= qt.
Following the quality signal choice, retailer sets her price p to maximize the expected profit
conditional on qt and qR. In a dual retailer channel, the retailers examine the product quality
independently and announce their retail prices to consumers simultaneously.
3In Section 4.3 we consider a special case where retailer’s examination technology is perfect (γ = 1). In this case,
the retailer knows the true product quality after evaluating the product. We provide insights into how this perfect
information about product quality affects the retailer’s incentive to misrepresent the low-quality product.
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2.3 Consumers
Consumers purchase at most one unit of the product with a goal to maximize their utility. They are
heterogeneous with respect to how much utility they derive from consuming the product when they
face no product failure. This valuation parameter is denoted by v, and we assume that v ∼ U [0, 1].
Consumers derive zero utility from a product that fails.
Due to the credence nature of the product, consumers cannot determine the true quality of a
product (qM ) on their own. In the absence of any information about production costs and wholesale
price, they cannot use the retail price to infer the true product quality either. In the benchmark
model we assume that consumers are credulous: they completely rely on the retailer signal to infer
product quality, i.e., they believe that the retailer is always truthful and that qR = qt. In Section
4.2, we consider a scenario where some consumers are non-credulous and discount retailer’s signal,
considering the possibility of strategic misrepresentation.
In the absence of any information, consumers would have to assume that a product is equally
likely to be of high or low quality, hence their prior belief about the probability of product failure
is r2 . However, conditional on the observed signal qR and the precision of the retailer’s examination
technology γ they update their belief about the failure probability. Let ρi denote the probability
of failure conditional on observed signal qR = i in a single retailer channel. Let ρij denote the
same probability conditional on observed signals qR1 = i and qR1 = j in a dual retailer channel.
Then the expected utility of a consumer from buying the product in a single retailer channel can
be formally expressed as
EU i = EU(v, p|qR = i) = v(1− ρi)− p, i ∈ {L,H}, (2)
and that in a dual retailer channel can be expressed as
EU ijk = EU(v, pk|qR1 = i, qR2 = j) = v(1− ρij)− pk, i ∈ {L,H}, (3)
where pk is the price charged by retailer Rk. All consumers with non negative expected utility
purchase the product.
2.4 Quality Misrepresentation and Reputation Damage
In this framework misrepresentation is defined as the deviation of the retailer’s signal qR from
retailer’s opinion on the product quality, qt. First, a retailer may choose to oversell the product
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and send a high quality signal, qR = H when she believes the product quality is low, qt = L. Such
strategic misrepresentation by overselling creates a moral hazard problem between the retailer and
consumers. Second, if a retailer chooses to undersell the product, she presents the product as low
quality, qR = L, despite believing it is of high quality, qt = H. This second type of strategic
misrepresentation creates a moral hazard problem between the retailer and manufacturer.
With credence goods the true product quality may remain unknown to consumers even post-
purchase. We assume that whenever the consumers discover that the true product quality qM
differs from the quality signal qR sent by the retailer, the retailer faces a reputation damage of
τ > 0 because consumers cannot tell whether the retailer strategically misrepresented her opinion
about the product quality or was truthful but made an error while examining the product. Since
we consider a single-period game, we use this reputation damage (cost) parameter to quantify
the cumulative negative future effect on retailer’s profits caused by diminished reputation. For
example, this damage can come from the fact that some consumers will stop buying from this
retailer altogether, or will sue the retailer for misrepresentation, or will no longer completely trust
the retailer’s quality signal.
In our model, the only situation where consumers learn the true product quality is when the
product fails post-purchase, revealing that it is of low quality, qM = L. If the product they have
purchased never fails, consumers cannot determine whether the product is of high quality or low
quality and happened not to fail. Hence it is only when consumers purchase a product accompanied
by a high quality signal qR = H and observe product failure post-purchase, the retailer experiences
reputation damage τ . On the other hand, if the retailer sells the product accompanied by low
quality signal qR = L and such product fails, no reputation damage is incurred by the retailer since
the revealed product quality corresponds to the retailer’s signal. Thus when making her decision
about whether to send a high or low quality signal to consumers, the retailer evaluates the trade-off
between the expected reputation damage and the gain in profits from selling the product with a
high quality signal and a higher price.
We assume that reputation damage τ is unknown to consumers but is common knowledge
for manufacturer and retailers. In case of multiple retailers, they split the τ reputation damage
proportional to their demand. In the benchmark model, we assume that the reputation damage is
only experienced by the retailers, but in Section 4.1, we consider a scenario where the manufacturer
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also experiences reputation damage.
2.5 Timeline of the Game
Within each channel design - single or dual retailer channel - we solve for equilibria strategies in a
backward induction fashion. The timeline of the game is as follows:
1. The manufacturer chooses the product quality, qM ∈ {H,L}, and then determines the whole-
sale price (w) (consecutively).
2. The retailer examines the product and forms an opinion qt about its quality. Conditional
on this opinion, she sets the quality signal to be sent to consumers: qR ∈ {H,L}, and then
determines the retail price. In a dual retailer channel, the two retailers conduct their product
examination independently and announce their signals and prices to consumers simultane-
ously.
3. Consumers observe the quality signal(s) from the retailer(s), update their beliefs about prod-
uct failure probability conditional on the signal(s), and calculate the expected utility from
consuming the product. Consumers with non-negative expected utility purchase the product.
4. Consumers consume the product and receive utility. If the true product quality is low, then
with probability r it fails. If the failed product was represented to consumers as a high-quality
product, then retailer(s) faces a total reputation damage equal to τ .
3 Analysis
We start our analysis with a benchmark model where the manufacturer distributes the product
via a single retailer. We then proceed with the analysis of a dual retailer channel and compare
the equilibrium outcomes in order to investigate the impact of the channel design on the strategy
choice incentives of the upstream and downstream channel members.
3.1 Benchmark Model: Single Retailer Channel Design
Consider a single retailer R who sells the product of a manufacturer M . To deliver the key messages
of our paper, we will focus on the behavior of the credulous consumers with reputation damage
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incurred by the downstream member only. In Section 4 we show that the key results obtained
in the benchmark model hold even when channel members share reputation costs (Section 4.1) or
when consumers are non-credulous (Section 4.2).
We solve the game in a backward induction fashion, starting with the consumers’ decision to
purchase the product. First, consumers need to update the product failure probability. Recall that
credulous consumers believe that qt = qR. Thus when consumers observe a high quality signal,
their updated product failure probability is equal to
ρH = P (failure|qR = H) = rP (qM = L|qt = H) = r(1− γ).
By the same token, when consumers observe a low quality signal, their updated probability of
product failure is calculated as
ρL = P (failure|qR = L) = rP (qM = L|qt = L) = rγ.
Since γ > 0.5, the updated beliefs about the product failure conditional on retailer’s signal are
ρH <
r
2 < ρL, where
r
2 is the consumers’ prior product failure belief. Notice that the assumption of
credulity does not prevent consumers from recognizing the possibility that the product accompanied
by a high quality signal might fail.
Second, consumers need to compute their expected utility from product purchase. Substituting
probabilities ρH and ρL into consumers’ utility function given in Equation (2), we obtain the
valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the product
for each quality signal sent by the retailer:
vH(p) =
p
1− r(1− γ)
if qR = H, (4)
vL(p) =
p
1− rγ
if qR = L.
Conditional on the signal she sends, the retailer faces a demand of (1− vH(p)) or (1− vL(p)).
To determine the expected profit for each quality signal qR the retailer can send, she considers all
possible combinations of unobservable true product quality, qM , and her opinion on it, qt.
If the retailer’s opinion about product quality is qt = H, she knows that with probability γ
she is correct in her assessment and there is zero risk of product failure and reputation damage if
she sends a high quality signal qR = H. With the remaining probability (1− γ), the opinion qt is
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incorrect, in which case a product failure can happen with probability r. In the latter case, the
retailer’s reputation will suffer if she sends a high quality signal. Conditional on the opinion qt = H,
the retailer’s expected profits from setting her quality signal for the product to be qR ∈ {L,H} is:
πqRHR (p) =

(1− vH(p))(p− w)− (1− γ)rτ, if qR = H
(1− vL(p))(p− w), if qR = L,
(5)
where (1−γ)rτ is the expected reputation damage if the product fails following high quality signal
sent by the retailer.
If the retailer’s examination technology suggests that the product is of low quality (qt = L),
then with probability γ this opinion is correct and the product will fail with probability r, in which
case retailer will experience a damage to her reputation if she misrepresents the product quality by
setting qR = H. If she sends a low quality signal qR = L, she will not experience any reputation
damage. Therefore, conditional on her opinion qt = L, retailer’s expected profits from setting her
quality signal for the product to be qR ∈ {H,L} is:
πqRLR (p) =

(1− vH(p))(p− w)− γrτ if qR = H
(1− vL(p))(p− w) if qR = L.
(6)
Equations (5) and (6) together allow us to derive the conditions for the retailer to follow one
of the strategies outlined earlier: Being Truthful, Overselling, Underselling, and Mismatching. The
following lemma lists retailer’s optimal product representation strategy conditional on the value of
reputation damage τ .
Lemma 1. In a single retailer channel, the retailer is
(1) Overselling: always sends quality signal qR = H if τ < τL(w) ≡ ξ(w)γ ,
(2) Underselling: always sends quality signal qR = L if τ > τH(w) ≡ ξ(w)(1−γ) , and
(3) Truthful: sends quality signal qR = qt otherwise;
where ξ(w) ≡ (2γ−1)(1−r−w
2+r2γ(1−γ))
4(1−γr)(1−(1−γ)r) . Moreover, a Mismatching strategy is never optimal.
Proof. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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Lemma 1 addresses a key research question: Under what conditions will a retailer follow truthful
quality representation strategy? The lemma suggests that a truthful representation will only exist if
the reputation damage is medium. A low reputation damage incentivizes moral hazard as the seller
is willing to take the risk of overselling and deceiving the consumer. As the reputation damage
increases past τL(w), it initially disciplines the retailer to act truthfully. But as the reputation
damage further increases (τ > τH(w)), the uncertainty about the true quality of the product in
combination with high possible reputation damage forces the retailer to lower its own liability by
always underselling the product.
Observation 1. The thresholds τL(w), τH(w) of reputation cost which eliminate misrepresentation
decrease in w (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Thresholds τL, τH vs. w at γ = 0.8, r = 0.7.
An important observation pertains to the fact that the threshold values of τ which dictate the
strategy of the downstream partner in a sales channel is a decreasing function of the upstream part-
ner’s price. As w increases, the room for overselling and truthful strategies narrows. Specifically,
when w >
√
(1− γ)γr2 − r + 1, the retailer always undersells in order to protect herself from any
potential losses from reputation damage.
More importantly, the relationship between the reputation cost thresholds and w show that the
amount of misrepresentation in the market is, in part, determined by the manufacturer and how
much leeway he gives in profits to the retailer to correct for loss from reputation damage. Stated
differently, the amount of consumer deception in retail channel is determined by joint decisions of
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the upstream and downstream partners, i.e., manufactureres and retailers. To extend this insight,
in Section 4.3, we analyze the case where the retailer can perfectly assess product quality (γ = 1),
therefore she is fully strategic in introducing fraud in the market. In this case, the manufacturer
can make choices to eliminate retailer fraud, but the analysis shows that the manufacturer still
makes choices which allow products to be sold under the false premises of having higher quality
than they really do.
Further, the manufacturer faces a trade-off. On the one hand, he can decrease prices slightly,
through which he can encourage the retailer to better communicate the quality of its product.
However, by doing so he limits his profit margins. This would imply that some products which
are of high quality (and are believed to be of high quality by the sellers) are consistently presented
to consumers as low-quality products, to provide an insurance for the retailer against possible
reputation damage. A manufacturer with high and non-flexible prices is more likely to face a
problem of motivating the retailer to communicate product quality truthfully, when everything else
remains identical.
Following backward induction, we next investigate the equilibrium prices and quality set by
the manufacturer in an exclusive retail channel. The derivations yield4 that the optimal wholesale
prices the manufacturer charges in the pure strategy equilibrium are:
wHT =
1
2
(cH +
β
(1− r + η)
) wLT =
1
2
(cL +
β
(1− η)
), (7)
wHO =
1
2
(cH + 1− (1− γ)r) wLO =
1
2
(cL + 1− (1− γ)r),
wHU =
1
2
(cH + 1− γr) wLU =
1
2
(cL + 1− γr),
where η ≡ 2rγ(1 − γ) and β ≡ 1 − r + r2(1 − γ)γ and wij denotes the wholesale price of product
with quality qM = i ∈ {L,H} when retailer follows strategy j ∈ {O, T, U}.
Equation set (7) shows why the retailer is unable to infer manufacturer’s quality from the whole-
sale prices: wholesale prices depend on the production cost ci, i ∈ {H,L} which is manufacturer’s
private information. Any observed value of wholesale price w can be associated with multiple values
of ci. By only observing one wholesale price w, the retailer cannot form an opinion about product
quality and must rely on the examination technology instead.
4See Proof of Lemma 2 for details.
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Lemma 2. In a single retailer channel, the manufacturer produces a high-quality product only if
he expects the retailer to follow strategy T and
cH < c
T ≡ β
(1− r + η)
(
1−
√
1− r + η
1− η
)
+ cL
√
1− η
1− r + η
.
Lemma 2 suggests that the provision of a high-quality product into the marketplace relies on
two conditions to be met together. Not only should the cost of production be sufficiently attractive,
but the manufacturer must also trust that the representation will be truthful. A low production
cost alone is not sufficient for high-quality products to become available to consumers. In addition,
the manufacturer must trust his channel partner to fairly communicate the quality of his product
to the consumers. Lack of trust in a retail channel will result in consumers being served with low
quality products.
Next, using the functions wij , thresholds cT and τi(w), we derive the equilibria strategies.
5
Without loss of generality, to reduce the complexity of expressions, we set the production cost of
a low-quality product to zero (cL = 0) for the rest of the analysis. Further, we focus on the pure
strategy equilibria (as depicted in Figure 2). Proposition 1 provides the conditions under which
strategic misrepresentation will rise as a pure strategy equilibrium outcome in a single retailer
distribution channel.
Proposition 1. In a single retailer channel,
(1) Manufacturer choosing to produce a low-quality product and retailer misrepresenting by un-
derselling is a unique equilibrium outcome if τ > τLUH ;
(2) Manufacturer choosing to produce a low-quality product and retailer misrepresenting by over-
selling is a unique equilibrium outcome if τ < τLO and r < 35γ−1 .
6
First, Proposition 1 confirms that when the manufacturer expects misrepresentation, he prefers
to make a low-quality product, as Lemma 1 already hinted. Since the manufacturer bears no
consequences for misrepresentation, it is never optimal for him to produce a high-quality product
knowing that the retailer will misrepresent by either under or overselling, as it only involves higher
5For detailed description of equilibria, please see the Supplemental Materials, page 1.
6The closed form expressions for thresholds τ ij and τ ijH are given in the Supplemental Materials, page 4.
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production cost but does not lead to any additional benefits on the demand side. In other words,
there is an equilibrium level of misrepresentation in the market which is jointly determined by the
retailer’s and the manufacturer’s preferences, as Wolinsky (1993) notes.
Further, the first part of Proposition 1 demonstrates that high reputation costs might be detri-
mental to the channel. When τ > τLUH , the retailer is so cautious about avoiding reputation damage
that even if her examination determined the quality to be high (qt = H), she still sends consumers a
low quality signal qR = L. The expected reputation cost, if her opinion on quality is wrong, exceeds
the benefits from higher demand and profits associated with the high quality signal (qR = H). On
the other hand, expecting the retailer to undersell the product, the manufacturer prefers to pro-
duce a low-quality product, even when the production cost cH is small and the high-quality product
could lead to higher profits if the retailer were to represent it truthfully. As a result, consumers
miss out on enjoying a high-quality product.
The second part of Proposition 1 shows that strategic misrepresentation of a low-quality product
can be eliminated, regardless of the magnitude of reputation damage τ , if the probability of product
failure is high enough r > 35γ−1 . Notice that this condition can only be satisfied for some r ∈ (0, 1)
when γ > 0.8; hence only when r and γ are both sufficiently high, will the expected reputation
damage be high enough for the retailer to avoid misrepresenting low-quality product. In other
words, if a low-quality product has a high likelihood of failure, and the retailer is known to be able
to detect low quality with high precision, she will prefer not to oversell the product.
We next examine the link between strategic misrepresentation and profits. The following propo-
sition suggests that the preferences for strategic misrepresentation versus truthful representation
are not always aligned for the upstream and downstream members of the channel.
Proposition 2. In a single retailer channel,
(1) Both (H,T) and (L,O) are equilibrium outcomes if cH < c
T and τ ∈
(
τHT , τLO
)
. In this case,
the retailer earns higher profit in (H,T) outcome while the manufacturer earns higher profit
in (L,O) outcome:
πLO
∗
M > π
HT ∗
M and π
LO∗
R < π
HT ∗
R .
(2) (L,U) is the equilibrium outcome if τ > τLUH . In this case, and if cH < c
LU , both the retailer
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Figure 2: Pure Strategy Equilibria in (τ, cH) Space, Single-Retailer Channel.
and the manufacturer face a prisoner’s dilemma outcome:
πLU
∗
k < π
HT ∗
k , k ∈ {M,R}.
7 The first part of Proposition 2 demonstrates that there is a misalignment of preferences for the
representation strategy used by the upstream and downstream channel members. Notice that since
the manufacturer moves first, he will set product quality to low (qM = L ), and wholesale price to
wLO, forcing the retailer to oversell the product. In this case, any dissatisfaction among consumers
due to product failure can be partly blamed on the manufacturer. It can be demonstrated that
aggregate consumer welfare would be higher if the manufacturer produced a high-quality product.
This finding re-iterates that a manufacturer’s choices play a significant role in the downstream
player’s decision to misrepresent the product.
The second part of Proposition 2 demonstrates that high reputation costs can be detrimental for
both the manufacturer and the retailer, even though only the retailer is directly punished by con-
sumers. When the cost of producing a high-quality product is sufficiently small, the manufacturer
7The closed-form expression for threshold cLU is given in the proof of Proposition 2. πij
∗
k is the profit of channel
member k ∈ {M,R} when the manufacturer produces a product of quality i ∈ {H,L}, and the retailer follows
strategy j ∈ {O, T, U}. πij
∗
M is defined in proof of Lemma 2, and π
ij∗
R is defined in proof of Proposition 2.
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and the retailer would benefit from offering a high-quality product with truthful representation.
Since the retailer’s examination technology is imperfect, she cautiously chooses to set consumer
expectations of quality low by underselling the product. In turn, it is not optimal for the man-
ufacturer to produce a high-quality product, and the less preferred (L,U) outcome rises as the
equilibrium.
Overall, the single-retailer analysis supports three conclusions. First, for the retailer to act
truthfully, the cost of reputation should be medium. Too high and too low reputation damage
incentivize the retailer to deviate from her own opinion on product quality when signalling it
to consumers, i.e., to misrepresent the product to consumers. Second, producing a high-quality
product requires conditions beyond profitability: the manufacturer must trust that the retailer will
truthfully communicate her opinion on quality to the consumers. Third, when reputation costs
are very high, consumer expectation about quality is set low by underselling. In this case, both
parties (retailers and manufacturers) face a prisoner’s dilemma outcome when production costs are
sufficiently low: Each party earns lower profits in the (L,O) outcome due to lack of channel trust
compared to an outcome of (H,T).
3.2 Dual Retailer Channel Design
In this section we incorporate multiple downstream partners. Specifically, the model assumes two
identical retailers with similar technologies of product quality assessment; i.e., the precision of
both retailers’ technologies is equal to γ. We also assume that the retailers examine the quality
of the product independently, and each retailer forms an independent opinion about the product
quality as described by the set of equations (1). Further, upon product examination the retailers
simultaneously and independently decide what quality signals to send to consumers.
With two retailers in the marketplace, consumers observe signals from both retailers and update
their beliefs about the true quality of the product, and then decide whether to buy the product or
not depending on their expected utility. If they decide to buy, they buy a single unit from only one
of the two retailers.
Analyzing consumers’ ability to observe both retailers’ signals and to double check the credibility
of the signal provides two main insights. First, adding a second retailer to the channel who can
verify the product quality independently helps the high-quality manufacturer to convey the true
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quality of his product. If consumers observe both retailers signaling high quality, their updated
probability of product failure is reduced and the expected utility from buying the product is higher
than when consumers face an environment with a single retailer. Thus, both retailers can charge
higher prices. Formally represented, conditional on both retailers sending high quality signals, the
updated probability of product failure is smaller in a dual retailer channel:
ρHH = P{failure|qR1 = H, qR2 = H} =
(1− γ)2
(1− γ)2 + γ2
r < (1− γ)r = ρH ,
Similarly, conditional on both retailers sending low quality signal the product failure probability is
higher with two retailers:8
ρLL = P{failure|qR1 = L, qR2 = L} =
γ2
(1− γ)2 + γ2
r > γr = ρL.
When consumers observe conflicting retailer signals, they conclude that retailers have different
opinion on the product quality: qt1 = L, qt2 = H or qt1 = H, qt2 = L, which happens with
probability 2γ(1−γ). The conflicting signals are not informative to consumers because the updated
probability of product failure is equal to the prior:
ρHL = P{failure|qR1 = H, qR2 = L} = ρHL = P{failure|qR2 = H, qR1 = L} =
r
2
.
If both retailers follow a truthful representation strategy and obtain different signals in the
process of product examination, then retailer Ri with qtRi = H would send a high quality signal
to consumers (qRi = H) and set a higher retail price, only to find no demand because consumers
would choose to buy from the retailer with the lower price. Indeed, since the products sold by the
two retailers are identical, consumers’ expected consumption utility is the same regardless of which
retailer they buy from (v
(
1− r2
)
), and it’s only the retail price that makes the overall expected
purchase utilities EU ij1 and EU
ij
2 different.
9 Therefore in a dual retailer environment, each retailer
8Remember that consumers in our model are credulous and believe that retailers’ signals are identical to their
opinions, i.e., qt = qR. The total probability that two retailers independently observe the same quality signal is equal
to (1− γ)2 + γ2 and is obtained as follows:
P (qtR1 = qtR2 ) = P (qM = H)
[
P (qt = H|qM = H)2 + P (qt = L|qM = H)2
]
+
P (qM = L)
[
P (qt = H|qM = L)2 + P (qt = L|qM = L)2
]
=
1
2
(
γ2 + (1− γ)2
)
+
1
2
(
(1− γ)2 + γ2
)
.
9In our model, the retailers represent a point of sale and serve an informational role by sending consumers signals
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may find it more attractive (as compared to single retailer case) to send a low quality signal. This
way, in case of any miscoordination of signals they can avoid facing zero demand.
The expected utility EU ijk from purchasing a product from retailer Rk, k ∈ {1, 2} when retailer
R1 sends signal qR1 = i and retailer R2 sends signal qR2 = j is:
EUHHk =
(
1− (1− γ)
2
(1− γ)2 + γ2
r
)
v − pk, (8)
EULLk =
(
1− γ
2
(1− γ)2 + γ2
r
)
v − pk,
EUHL2 = EU
LH
1 =
(
1− r
2
)
v −min{p1, p2},
EUHL1 = EU
LH
2 =
(
1− r
2
)
v −max{p1, p2}.
Similar to the single retailer environment, we next solve for the best response functions of two
retailers, identify the threshold τLD(w) at which the reputation cost is high enough to enforce a
truthful strategy in equilibrium, and the threshold τHD(w) at which the reputation cost is high
enough to enforce an underselling strategy. Throughout this section, we use the subscript D to
denote an outcome in a dual retailer channel. We further derive the wholesale prices (denoted wijD,
where i = {L,H}, j = {O, T, U}), and finally derive the cost threshold (denoted by cTD) which
defines the manufacturer’s choice of product quality.10
The first question is whether changing the channel design by adding more downstream retailers
can provide a mechanism to reduce the extent of misrepresentation in the market. Increasing
the number of retailers may suggest that the temptation to misrepresent by overselling increases
because reputation damage is shared among a higher number of downstream members. However,
our analysis indicates that this is not the case. A lower reputation cost tolerance is present in
a dual retailer environment than in a single retailer channel: The maximum value of the overall
reputation damage τ which a retailer can withstand to misrepresent a low-quality product is lower
in a multiple retailer environment than in a single retailer environment. Although the retailers share
reputation damage, they each are more sensitive to it, reducing their tendency to misrepresent.
Proposition 3 summarizes this relationship.
about product quality. We focus on this role and thus assume that consumer utility relies on the product rather
than service characteristics. This is why consumers obtain the same expected consumption utility from the product
regardless of which retailer they buy from. Hence all the consumers will choose to purchase the product at the lowest
price from the low quality signal retailer.
10The detailed derivations are provided in the Supplemental Materials, page 5.
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Proposition 3. τLOD < τ
LO: Dual retailer channel design reduces the range of reputation damage
values τ where (L,O) is an equilibrium outcome as compared to a single retailer environment.
Although a lower tolerance for reputation damage does not fully eliminate strategic misrepre-
sentation by overselling in a multiple retailer channel, it decreases the retailer’s tendency to send
a high quality signal for a low-quality product compared to a single retailer channel. Operating
with multiple retailers increases an individual retailer’s risk of facing no demand in case she sends
a high quality signal to the consumers. The fear of no demand provides an additional incentive for
retailer Ri to follow truthful quality representation strategy and send a low quality signal qRi = L
upon observing qtRi = L. As a result, the competition between the retailers in the downstream
part of the channel motivates them to not oversell the low-quality product. Thus the extent of
overselling can be reduced by adding multiple distributional outlets to the downstream part of the
supply chain.
Next we compare the manufacturer’s incentive to produce a high-quality product in single
and dual retailer environments. Proposition 4 demonstrates that the cost threshold at which the
manufacturer starts producing a low-quality product is higher when operating with two retailers;
in other words, the manufacturer has more leeway to produce a high-quality product. Partnering
with multiple downstream partners supports provision of higher quality goods.
Proposition 4. cTD > c
T : Dual retailer channel design increases the range of manufacturing cost
values cH where (H,T) is an equilibrium outcome as compared to a single retailer environment.
For any cH ∈ (cT , cTD) and moderate values of τ (i.e., such τ that truthful strategy is optimal for
the retailer in either single or dual retailer channel), the manufacturer in a single retailer channel
would choose to produce a low-quality product whereas a manufacturer in a multiple retailer channel
would choose to produce a high-quality product. Put differently, in a multiple retailer channel, the
production of high quality products can be supported in equilibrium for higher cost margin cH
values than those in a single retailer environment. To see the intuition, recall that operating with
multiple retailers reduces the probability that a high-quality product will be mistakenly assessed
as a low-quality product. If retailers are truthful, the additional high quality signal in the market
leads to a higher demand because the probability of product failure is assessed (by consumers)
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to be lower. As a result, at the same production cost margin cH and fixed reputation damage τ ,
operating in a multiple-retailer channel may motivate the manufacturer to choose high over low
quality.
Finally, we compare the profits of the manufacturer in a single vs. dual retailer channel design.
Proposition 5 addresses whether reducing misrepresentation in a dual retailer channel can drive
manufacturer revenues higher.
Proposition 5. Adding a second retailer increases manufacturer’s profit when he produces a high-
quality product and retailers follow truthful strategy, and when he produces a low-quality product
and retailers misrepresent by overselling. Manufacturer’s profit decreases in other outcomes:
πHT
∗
M < π
HT ∗
MD
and πLO
∗
M < π
LO∗
MD
,
πLT
∗
M > π
LT ∗
MD
and πLU
∗
M > π
LU∗
MD
.
where the πij
∗
M (π
ij∗
MD
) is the optimal manufacturer’s profit in a single (dual) retailer environment in
the outcome (i,j).
Proposition 5 allows us to reiterate a key point of our study. Compared to the single retailer
design, a dual retailer design allows the manufacturer to increase his profits in both situations: if
the retailer is truthful or if the retailer oversells. Importantly, if a manufacturer could trust his
downstream partner to act truthfully, he would benefit from operating with multiple retailers and
would obtain higher profits compared to operating with a single retailer. Following this insight, we
extend our model in several directions by relaxing key assumptions.
4 Extensions
In this section, we relax the assumptions of the benchmark model. First, we allow the upstream
member of the channel to share the reputation damage with the downstream member. Second,
we relax the assumption of consumer credulity and consider the environment where consumers are
skeptical about retailer’s quality signal and account for the possibility of retailer misrepresenting the
product quality. Finally, we analyze the environment where the retailer’s examination technology
is perfect (γ = 1). We will only detail the extensions in the context of a single retailer channel;
notably, the direction of change is similar when there are multiple retailers.
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4.1 Shared Reputation Damage
In this section we relax the assumption that the reputation damage is incurred only by the down-
stream member of the channel. Instead, we allow consumers to punish both members: the re-
tailer for misrepresenting and the manufacturer for offering a low-quality product. Let parameter
λ ∈ (0, 1) quantify the proportion of blame the consumer places on the retailer. Then the manu-
facturer faces a reputation cost of (1− λ)τ and the retailer faces a cost of λτ .
When reputation damage is shared, the retailer’s expected profits from misrepresentation by
overselling strategy are as follows.
πHLRS (p) = πRS (qR = H, p|qt = L) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− γrτλ, (9)
πHHRS (p) = πRS (qR = H, p|qt = H) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− (1− γ)rτλ,
where the subscript “S” denotes the outcomes in shared reputation damage scenario.
The retailer’s expected profits from sending a low quality signal (under either truthful or over-
selling strategies) are the same as in the benchmark model (see expressions (5)-(6)) as the retailer
does not incur the reputation damage when qR = L even if the product fails. Manufacturer’s
expected profits when he produces a low-quality product are also slightly different from those in
the benchmark model (given by expressions (A.9)). With shared reputation damage, these profits
are as follows:
πLTMS (w) = (w − cL)
(
γ(1− vL(pL
∗
S )) + (1− γ)(1− vH(pH
∗
S ))
)
− (1− γ)r(1− λ)τ, (10)
πLOMS (w) = (w − cL)(1− vH(p
H∗
S ))− γ(1− λ)τr,
πLUMS (w) = (w − cL)(1− vL(p
L∗
S )),
where πLjMS (w) is the manufacturer’s expected profit if he produces a low-quality product, sets his
price to w, and expects the retailer to follow strategy j ∈ {O, T, U}.
Figure 3 maps the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes to the (τ, c) parameter space (the deriva-
tion of equilibrium outcomes is analogous to that in the benchmark model and is thus omitted), and
the proposition below highlights the impact of shared reputation damage on the set of equilibrium
outcomes and incentives to misrepresent in a vertical channel.
Proposition 6. When consumers attribute product failure to both the retailer and the manufacturer:
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Figure 3: Pure Strategy Equilibria in (τ, cH) Space, Single Retailer Channel, Shared Reputation
Damage (γ = .75, λ = .5, r = .5).
(1) (H,O) can be an equilibrium outcome: When cH < c
O
S , the manufacturer produces a high-
quality product even when he expects the retailer to misrepresent by overselling;
(2) τLUH < τ
LU
HS
: the range of reputation cost τ where prisoner’s dilemma outcome (L,U) rises is
narrower compared to when only the retailer faces the reputation damage.
The first part of Proposition 6 demonstrates that sharing the reputation damage leads to the
additional equilibrium outcome (H,O), compared to the retailer shouldering all of the blame. This
outcome is notably counter-intuitive. Even though the retailer follows an overselling strategy, the
manufacturer still produces a high-quality product. Thus, effectively the true product quality is
not misrepresented to consumers. Instead, the overselling strategy adopted by the retailer leads
to “signal correction” if the retailer incorrectly evaluates the product quality to be low (qt = L).
Neither the retailer nor the manufacturer would experience any reputation damage post-factum
since a high-quality product never fails.
Observation 2. πHOMS > π
HT
MS
.
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The observation implies that whenever outcome (H,T) is the equilibrium, it is detrimental to the
manufacturer’s profits. In outcome (H,T) a high-quality product can, with probability (1− γ), be
sold as a low-quality one due to the imperfection of the retailer’s examination technology, leading to
a lower demand. In (H,O) outcome not only is the product guaranteed to be sold as a high-quality
one (even if the retailer mistakenly thinks it is of low quality upon the product examination), but
the manufacturer also adds a “misrepresentation premium” to the wholesale price: wHOS > w
HT
S .
Jointly, these factors lead to higher profits under the outcome (H,O).
The rate at which the consumer attributes product failure to the retailer or the manufacturer
also impacts product quality. The more likely consumers are to attribute product failure to the
manufacturer (higher (1− λ)), the more inclined the manufacturer will be to produce a high-quality
product, as noted in Observation 3.
Observation 3. When the retailer follows the overselling strategy, the threshold cOS at which the
manufacturer prefers to offer a high-quality product over a low quality one is increasing with his
share of reputation cost, (1− λ).
Further, the second part of Proposition 6 shows that the prisoner’s dilemma outcome (L,U) is
not eliminated when consumers (partially) blame the manufacturer for misrepresentation, however,
the range where this outcome rises is smaller. Remember that the (L,U) outcome is caused by
the retailer being cautious in the presence of high τ : the expected damage is not worth the high
demand and profit to be obtained from a high quality signal qR = H even when retailer believes,
upon product examination, that the product has high-quality (qt = H). When the reputation cost
is shared, the reputation cost faced by the retailer (λτ) is smaller than the cost borne under full
attribution. Hence for τ ∈
(
τLUH , τ
LU
HS
)
, underselling strategy is replaced by truthful behavior. Put
simply, if the consumers can punish both channel members, the prisoner’s dilemma outcome can
be partially avoided.
4.2 Skeptical Consumers
Next, we relax the benchmark model’s assumption that consumers are credulous, i.e., they believe
that the signal (qR) sent by a retailer truthfully represents the retailer’s assessment (qR = qt).
Instead, we consider consumers to be skeptical. Let consumers consider the possibility that the
retailer may misrepresent a low-quality product. Specifically, we assume they believe there is only a
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chance φ that the retailer will truthfully convey the product’s low quality to them.11 More formally,
they believe that
φ = Prob (qR = L|qt = L) .
Stated differently, φ represents the degree of trustworthiness of the retailer for the consumer.
Since consumers are unaware of the reputation damage τ , they do not see why the retailer would
misrepresent a high product quality as low. As such, consumers believe if the retailer’s opinion of
the product quality is high (qt = H) then she will definitely send a high quality signal. In other
words, we assume that consumers believe P (qR = H|qt = H) = 1.
To isolate the effect of consumer skepticism, we keep the rest of our assumptions identical to
the benchmark model: we consider a single retailer channel where the cost of reputation damage
is incurred only by the retailer. Hereinafter the subscript ’sc’ denotes the outcomes with skeptical
consumers.
When consumers observe qR = H or qR = L, they update the probability of product failure
ρHsc and ρLsc respectively. Taking the degree of trustworthiness, φ, into account and using the
Bayes rule, the updated probabilities can be computed as follows:
P (qR = H) =
1
2 ((1− φ)γ + (1− γ)) +
1
2 (γ + (1− φ)(1− γ)) = 1−
φ
2
P (qR = L) =
1
2 (φγ) +
1
2 (φ(1− γ)) =
φ
2
and hence
ρHsc = rP (qM = L|qR = H) = r
P (qM = L)P (qR = H|qM = L)
P (qR = H)
= r
1− φγ
2− φ
(11)
ρLsc = rP (qM = L|qR = L) = r
P (qM = L)P (qR = L|qM = L)
P (qR = L)
= rγ
Note, if consumers believe that the retailer is completely trustworthy, i.e., if φ = 1, then these failure
probabilities converge to the ones in our benchmark model with credulous consumers. Given the
probabilities in Equation (11), the valuation of the consumer indifferent between buying and not
11Note, that this is not a rational expectation as we still focus on the outcomes where the retailer follows pure (as
opposed to mixed) strategy.
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buying the product for each quality signal sent by the retailer is as follows:
vLsc(p) =
p
1− γr
, if qR = L;
vHsc(p) =
p(2− φ)
2− r(1− γφ)− φ
, if qR = H.
Proposition 7 highlights the impact of consumer skepticism on the set of equilibrium outcomes and
incentives to misrepresent in the channel. Since, the process of deriving equilibrium outcomes is
analogous to the benchmark model, it is omitted for brevity.
Proposition 7. Compared to the environment with credulous consumers, when consumers are
skeptical
(1) τLOsc < τ
LO ⇐⇒
(
r < 3(2−φ)−5γφ+12γ+φ−3 and γ >
3−φ
12−5φ
)
: only if the failure probability (r) is
sufficiently small and examination technology (γ) is sufficiently precise, the range of reputa-
tion cost (τ) where overselling (L,O) is an equilibrium outcome becomes smaller.
(2) τLUHsc < τ
LU
H : the range of reputation cost values (τ) where (L,U) is the equilibrium outcome
is always larger.
Contrary to lay intuition, consumer skepticism does not always decrease the retailer’s incentive
to misrepresent by overselling. If the product has a low failure probability, one can observe the
positive effect of consumer skepticism by a decrease in the set of parameter values that support the
(L,O) outcome. Surprisingly, the incentive to oversell a low-quality product increases compared to
the case of credulous consumers when the product is highly likely to fail. Further, the proposition
indicates that consumer skepticism also has an adverse effect: the outcome (L,U) where the man-
ufacturer produces a low-quality product (even when the production cost is low enough to offer a
high-quality product) rises for a broader set of parameter values.
Notice that the deleterious impact of consumer skepticism outweighs the positive effect, when
the impact on the τ parameter is considered.
(
τLUHsc − τ
LU
H
)
>
(
τLO − τLOsc
)
, which implies that the
increase in the parameter range that supports underselling strategy in equilibrium is larger than the
decrease in parameter space that supports low-quality product misrepresentation outcome (L,O).
27
4.3 Perfect Product examination Technology
A particularly relevant question for legal cases on misrepresentation is whether a seller knowingly
misrepresented a product. The benchmark model allows the retailer to represent the true product
quality qM truthfully even when she follows misrepresentation by overselling strategy. Indeed,
under such a strategy the retailer sends a high quality signal to consumers (qR = H) upon forming
a belief qt = L about the product quality. In this caase here is still a (1−γ) chance that her opinion
is wrong, and the true product quality is in fact high (qM = H). As a result the retailer can argue
that the misrepresentation was innocent. Misrepresentation, independent of the retailer’s awareness
of quality defects, is a reason for legal action. However, fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation
have more significant legal consequences.
Now, consider a special case of the benchmark model where the retailer’s examination technology
is perfect. A perfect technology enables the retailer to be fully strategic in her behaviors as it
removes any possibility of misrepresentation due to incorrect examination of product quality. The
question we address here is whether quality misrepresentation still occurs. The following proposition
summarizes the impact of retailer’s certainty about product quality (the derivation of equilibrium
outcomes is analogous to the benchmark model and thus is omitted).
Proposition 8. In a single retailer channel when γ = 1:
(1) An underselling strategy is never optimal for the retailer, hence the outcome (L,U) never
occurs in equilibrium;
(2) An overselling strategy is optimal for the retailer if reputation damage, τ , and the product
failure probability, r, are sufficiently small: (L,O) is the equilibrium outcome when τ <
1
16
(
4− 11−r
)
, and r < 3/4.
Proposition 8 demonstrates that the retailer’s ability to detect true product quality only elim-
inates underselling. This result is intuitive: with perfect technology, the retailer knows that a
high quality signal never indicates a low-quality product, therefore, underselling is never necessary.
Moral hazard, however, is still present as (L,O) is the equilibrium outcome for some parameter val-
ues, although the parametric region where misrepresentation by overselling takes place is smaller.
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Indeed, one can easily see that τLO > 116
(
4− 11−r
)
. So when the retailer is fully capable of detect-
ing low quality, she still will not fully refrain from misrepresentation, even though all agents in the
market are aware of her perfect technology.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of channel design on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s
incentives to misrepresent a credence product offered in a vertical channel. Further, this is the
first paper to relate product failure attribution by customers to the structure of the distribution
channel. We consider a two-level channel where consumers’ uncertainty about product quality is
a function of the channel design. We compare two designs: a single-retailer and a dual-retailer
design. Without observing any seller signals, consumers assume that the product has r2 chance of
failure. To update their beliefs, they interpret and rely on quality signals from the retailers. With
each additional retailer signal, their belief about the true quality of a product is updated.
It is well known that information asymmetries present in credence goods markets lead to in-
efficiencies (Dulleck et al., 2011). Our study offers some novel and useful insights to managers
about channel relationships and misrepresentation of credence goods in exclusive and dual-retailer
channels. First, the single retailer channel analysis suggests that both low and high reputation
costs give incentive to the retailer to refrain from truthfully representing the quality of a product.
Moreover, the manufacturer needs to trust the retailer to act truthfully in representing product
quality to offer a high quality product. When the manufacturer expects the retailer to deviate
from truthful behavior, he prefers to offer a low quality product to consumers. By doing so, the
manufacturer benefits from misrepresentation as well. Since their point of contact is the retailer,
consumers in the main model punish the retailer, which results in the manufacturer to occasionally
prefer product misrepresentation. In particular, with medium reputation cost and low cost of pro-
ducing a high-quality product, the manufacturer earns higher revenue when the retailer oversells.
Equally important, the manufacturer’s pricing decision partly determines whether the downstream
partner will misrepresent or not. A high quality manufacturer may find it beneficial to lower its
price in order to induce retailer communication with consumers that the product is of high quality.
Second, in a dual-retailer or non-exclusive distribution, we find that the extent of misrepresenta-
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tion in the marketplace is reduced. This finding is counter-intuitive to the the idea that an exclusive
distribution arrangement between the B2B partners can reduce moral hazard. Two forces lower
misrepresentation in a non-exclusive retail channel. Primarily, with each additional downstream
member in a channel, a high quality manufacturer can signal its quality more credibly. This effect
partially erases the manufacturer’s desire for misrepresentation of his product. Secondarily, the
enhanced cost tolerance for producing a high quality good incentivizes the retailers to be truthful.
Moreover, having multiple downstream members can also increase the profit of the retailers and
the manufacturer, despite enhanced competition.
The outcomes we observe about the quality choices of the manufacturer and channel design
may provide an explanation for why different firms operate with different distribution strategies.
Aside from the reasons cited in the literature, our findings suggest that the ability to create (or,
sometimes prevent) consumer misconceptions about product quality can be an important determi-
nant of channel design. A manufacturer who prefers to sign an exclusive distribution contract with
a retailer may be more likely to face misrepresentation than another who sells through multiple
retailers. For example, rather than selling through a single authorized dealer, some brands may
prefer to have a (small) number of authorized retailers in each market. Firms wanting to reduce
the extent of misrepresentation may want their products to be sold by multiple retailers, as op-
posed to a single retailer. Another strategic insight that discredits lay intuition is that retailers do
not have to face lower demand (and profitability) in the multiple-retailer scenario, compared to a
single-retailer scenario.
We extended our model in several directions in Section 4. We relax the assumptions about
consumers fully trusting the retailer signals, we allow the retailers to be fully strategic in choosing
their representation and we also let consumers punish both the retailer and the manufacturer.
Additional avenues that can be explored are many. Our paper studies a stylized model with
single or dual retailers and a single manufacturer. Future research may find value in exploring
additional channel designs, specifically when the downstream member has a stronger role. For
example, for some channels, the downstream member (retailer) may be able to choose the number
of manufacturers from whom to purchase. Our study can provide a benchmark for channel members
considering alternate designs. We assume in the model that the retailers’ role in the market is to
sell goods, to signal quality, and to drive demand. Clearly, there are markets in which retailers can
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provide other functions, such as providing installation and after-sales service, thus adding to the
consumers’ utility. This is typically true for business-to-business and industrial markets. When the
service provided yields a fixed utility to the consumer, then this fixed utility can be captured in the
current model and the qualitative message of our model would not change. However, investigating
the case when consumers have differential level of utilities for different services can be an interesting
area of future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
If the retailer formed opinion qt = H upon product examination, then with probability γ the
product has high quality (qM = H) and with probability (1 − γ) it has low quality (qM = L), in
which case the product fails with probability r and the retailer’s reputation will suffer if her signal
is high qR = H. If the retailer sends qR = H upon forming the opinion qt = H, her expected profit
is:
πHHR (w) = πR{qR = H, p|qt = H}(w) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− (1− γ)rτ. (A.1)
Similarly, if the retailer formed opinion qt = L but sends a high quality signal qR = H, her expected
profit is:
πHLR (w) = πR{qR = H, p|qt = L}(w) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− γrτ. (A.2)
If the retailer’s opinion on product quality is qt = H or qt = L and she sends consumers a low
quality signal qR = L, independent of the true product quality, she will face no reputation cost.
The expected profit in this case is:
πLHR (w) = π
LL
R (w) = πR{qR = L, p|qt = i}(w) = (1− vL(p))(p− w). (A.3)
Plugging the valuation of the consumer indifferent between buying and not buying derived from
Equation (4) into equations (A.1)-(A.3), and solving the first order conditions w.r.t. retailer prices
yield:
p∗H(w) =
1
2
(1− r(1− γ) + w) if qR = H, (A.4)
p∗L(w) =
1
2
(1− rγ + w) if qR = L.
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The retailer profits given in (A.1)-(A.3) can be compared after plugging the expressions obtained
in (A.4):
πHHR (w)− πLHR (w) =
(1− w − (1− γ)r)2
4(1− (1− γ)r)
− (1− γr − w)
2
4(1− γr)
− rτ(1− γ), (A.5)
πHLR (w)− πLLR (w) =
(1− w − (1− γ)r)2
4(1− (1− γr))
− (1− w − γr)
2
4(1− γr)
− γrτ.
Expressions given in (A.5) show that depending on how large the reputation cost τ is, the retailer
can follow one of the three following strategies:
1. Overselling : If τ ∈ (0, τL(w)) then πHLR (w) > πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) > πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = H regardless of observed qt;
2. Truthful : If τ ∈ (τL(w), τH(w)) then πHLR (w) < πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) > πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = qt;
3. Underselling : If τ ∈ (τH(w),∞) then πHLR (w) < πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) < πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = L regardless of observed qt,
where
τL(w) =
(2γ − 1)
(
1 + (1− γ)γr2 − r − w2
)
4γ(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
, (A.6)
τH(w) =
(2γ − 1)
(
1 + (1− γ)γr2 − r − w2
)
4(1− γ)(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
.
Notice that for the Mismatching strategy to be optimal, the following two inequalities must
hold simultaneously:
πHHR (w) < π
LH
R (w)⇔ τ < τL(w), (A.7)
πHLR (w) > π
LL
R (w)⇔ τ > τH(w). (A.8)
However, τL(w) < τH(w) because γ > 1/2 and inequalities (A.7) and (A.8) cannot hold together.
Hence a Mismatching strategy is never optimal for the retailer.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The manufacturer can offer a high or a low-quality product. If he offers a high-quality product,
there is a (1−γ) chance that the retailer will incorrectly identify the product quality and decide that
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the quality is low. In this case she will send a low quality signal if she follows a truthful strategy
and a high quality signal if she follows an overselling strategy. If the manufacturer produces a
low-quality product, the retailer may incorrectly identify it as a high-quality product and match it
with high quality signal when she follows a truthful strategy. The manufacturer’s expected profit
πijM when quality is set qM = i ∈ {L,H} and the retailer is following strategy j ∈ {O, T, U} can be
expressed formally as:
πHTM (w) = (w − cH) (γ(1− v∗H) + (1− γ)(1− v∗L)) , (A.9)
πLTM (w) = (w − cL) (γ(1− v∗L) + (1− γ)(1− v∗H)) ,
πHOM (w) = (1− v∗H)(w − cH),
πLOM (w) = (1− v∗H)(w − cL),
πHUM (w) = (1− v∗L)(w − cH),
πLUM (w) = (1− v∗L)(w − cL),
where v∗i ≡ vi(p∗i (w)). Plugging the indifferent consumer valuations from Equation (4) and the
retailer prices from (A.4) in (A.9), and solving the FOCs, the optimal wholesale prices are obtained:
wHT =
cH
2
+
(1− γ)γr2 + 1− r
2(1− r (2γ2 − 2γ + 1))
, (A.10)
wLT =
cL
2
+
1− r + r2(1− γ)γ
2− 4γr(1− γ)
,
wHO =
1
2
(cH − (1− γ)r + 1),
wLO =
1
2
(cL − (1− γ)r + 1),
wHU =
1
2
(cH − γr + 1),
wLU =
1
2
(cL − γr + 1),
where wij denotes the manufacturer prices when qM = i ∈ {L,H} and the retailer follows strategy
j ∈ {O, T, U}.
Substituting prices (A.10) into the manufacturer profit functions (A.9) shows that πLO
∗
M > π
HO∗
M
and πLU
∗
M > π
HU∗
M for any (γ, r), where π
ij∗
M stands for optimal manufacturer’s profit in outcome
(i, j): πij
∗
M ≡ π
ij
M (w
ij). So if the retailer follows strategy (O) or (U) then manufacturer’s best
response is not to produce a high-quality product. A high-quality product will only be produced if
retailer follows truthful strategy (T ).
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In addition, solving equation πHT
∗
M − πLT
∗
M = 0 for cH results in the threshold c
T .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Statement (1) directly follows from the list of pure strategy equilibria given in Supplemental Ma-
terials, on page 1. To obtain Statement (2) first notice that τLO (where closed form expression of
τLO is given in Supplemental Materials, on page 4) is decreasing in r. Then solve τLO = 0 for r to
obtain τLO < 0⇔ r > 35γ−1 . And τ
LO < 0 implies that there are no feasible (i.e., positive) values
of τ that satisfy condition τ < τLO for outcome (L,O) to rise in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(1) Statement πLO
∗
M > π
HT ∗
M follows from straightforward comparison of manufacturer’s expected
profits. To verify the second statement, the expected retailer’s profits in outcomes (H,T) and (L,O)
need to be defined first.
First note that due to the credence nature of the product (qM being manufacturer’s private
information) and imperfection of retailer’s examination technology (γ < 1), the retailer computes
the expected profit from sending qR conditional on her opinion qt (e.g., π
qRqt
R ) when making her
decision about quality signal qR = i ∈ {H,L} to be sent, as opposed to the expected profit in a
particular equilibrium outcome (i.e. πqM jR where j ∈ {O, T, U}). Thus the retailer’s expected profit
in (H,T) outcome should be computed as follows:
πHT
∗
R = γ
(
(1− vH
(
p∗H(w
HT )
)
)(p∗H(w
HT )− wHT ))
)
+(1−γ)
(
(1− vL
(
p∗L(w
HT )
)
)(p∗L(w
HT )− wHT )
)
Similarly, retailer’s profit in (L,O) outcome is computed as follows
πLO
∗
R =
(
(1− vH(p∗H(wLO)))(p∗H(wLO)− wLO)
)
− rτ
Now, by substituting optimal wholesale prices and comparing retailer’s expected profits in outcomes
(H,T) and (L,O) one can see that πHT
∗
R > π
LO∗
R .
(2) Solving the equation πLU
∗
M = π
HT ∗
M for cT results in the threshold
cLU =
((1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr))
(
1−
√
1−(1−2γ(1−γ))r
1−(1−γ)r
)
2(1− γ)γr − r + 1
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such that manufacturer earns higher profit in outcome (H,T) than in outcome (L,U) whenever
cH < c
LU . Further, the retailer’s expected profit in outcome (L,U) is defined as
πLU
∗
R =
(
1− vL(p∗L(wLU ))
) (
p∗L(w
LU )− wLU
)
,
and straightforward comparison shows that πLU
∗
R < π
HT ∗
R always.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The statement of the proposition, τLOD < τ
LO follows from direct comparison of the thresholds τLOD
and τLO.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The statement of the proposition follows from direct comparison of the thresholds cTD and c
T .
Proof of Proposition 5:
The statement of the proposition follows from direct comparison of manufacturer’s profits.
Proof of Proposition 6: (1) To demonstrate the first statement of the proposition, we solve
πHO
∗
MS
= πLO
∗
MS
for cH to obtain threshold c
O
S :
cOS = 1− r(1− γ)−
√
(1− (1− γ)r)(1− r(−γ + 8(1− λ)τ + 1))
(2) Second statement of the proposition follows from direct comparison of thresholds τLUH and
τLUHS .
Proof of Proposition 7:
(1) First statement of the proposition follows from solving τLOsc < τ
LO for r: obtain τLOsc < τ
LO ⇐⇒(
r < 3(2−φ)−5γφ+12γ+φ−3
)
. Further, notice that 3(2−φ)−5γφ+12γ+φ−3 > 0 (and hence there is a non-empty set
of r satisfying the condition above) only if γ > 3−φ12−5φ .
(2) Second statement of the proposition follows from direct comparison of τLUHsc and τ
LU
H .
Proof of Proposition 8: The statement of the proposition follows from substituting γ = 1 into
τLO and τLUH .
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS:
Derivations of Equilibrium Outcomes.
Equilibrium Outcomes in a Single Retailer Environment.
We derive equilibrium strategies in backward induction fashion starting with retailer’s choice of price
and representation strategy. If the retailer formed an opinion qt = H upon product examination,
then with probability γ it is indeed a high-quality product (qM = H). However, there is still a
(1−γ) probability that qM = L, in which case the product will fail with probability r, in which case
retailer’s reputation will suffer if she were to send a high quality signal qR = H, since consumers
cannot distinguish between a retailer intentionally misleading them or being sincerely wrong about
the product quality. So if the retailer sends qR = H upon observing qt = H, her expected profit
πqtqRR is:
πHHR (w) = πR{qR = H, p|qt = H}(w) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− (1− γ)rτ. (S.1)
Similarly, if the retailer formed opinion qt = L but sends a high quality signal qR = H, her expected
profit πqtqRR is:
πHLR (w) = πR{qR = H, p|qt = L}(w) = (1− vH(p))(p− w)− γrτ. (S.2)
Further, if the retailer sends consumers a low quality signal qR = L regardless of the opinion
qt she formed about the product quality, her reputation will not suffer regardless of what the true
product quality is. Her expected profit πqtqRR in this case is:
πLHR (w) = π
LL
R (w) = πR{qR = L, p|qt = i}(w) = (1− vL(p))(p− w). (S.3)
Plugging the location of indifferent consumers given in Equation (4) into equations (S.1)-(S.3),
and solving the first order conditions yield optimal retailer prices:
p∗H(w) =
1
2
(1− r(1− γ) + w) if qR = H, (S.4)
p∗L(w) =
1
2
(1− rγ + w) if qR = L.
Plugging the optimal retail prices into the retailer’s profits (S.1)-(S.3) and comparing them in
1
order to derive product quality representation strategies yield:
πHHR (w)− πLHR (w) =
(1− w − (1− γ)r)2
4(1− (1− γ)r)
− (1− γr − w)
2
4(1− γr)
− rτ(1− γ), (S.5)
πHLR (w)− πLLR (w) =
(1− w − (1− γ)r)2
4(1− (1− γr))
− (1− w − γr)
2
4(1− γr)
− γrτ.
Equating the difference in profits given in (S.5) to zero and solving for τ we find that there are
three possible strategies the retailer can follow:
1. Overselling : If τ ∈ (0, τL(w)) then πHLR (w) > πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) > πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = H regardless of observed qt;
2. Truthful : If τ ∈ (τL(w), τH(w)) then πHLR (w) < πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) > πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = qt;
3. Underselling : If τ ∈ (τH(w),∞) then πHLR (w) < πLLR (w) and πHHR (w) < πLHR (w), hence the
retailer earns highest profit by setting qR = L regardless of observed qt,
where
τL(w) =
(2γ − 1)
(
1 + (1− γ)γr2 − r − w2
)
4γ(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
, (S.6)
τH(w) =
(2γ − 1)
(
1 + (1− γ)γr2 − r − w2
)
4(1− γ)(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
.
For the Mismatching strategy to be optimal, the following two inequalities must hold simulta-
neously:
πHHR (w) < π
LH
R (w)⇔ τ < τL(w), (S.7)
πHLR (w) > π
LL
R (w)⇔ τ > τH(w). (S.8)
However, notice that τL(w) is always smaller than τH(w) because γ > 1/2, hence inequalities (S.7)
and (S.8) are mutually exclusive. Hence Mismatching strategy is never optimal for the retailer.
Further, at the beginning of the game, the manufacturer has two possible strategies: to offer
high-quality or low-quality product. When the manufacturer offers a high-quality product, there is
a (1− γ) chance that the retailer will incorrectly identify the product quality, and decide that the
quality is low. In this case she will send a low quality signal if she follows a truthful strategy, and
high quality signal if she follows an overselling strategy. Likewise, when the manufacturer produces
2
a low-quality product, the retailer might incorrectly identify it as a high-quality product and send
a high quality signal even if she follows a truthful strategy.
The manufacturer’s expected profit πijM from producing a product of quality qM = i ∈ {L,H}
given that the retailer is following strategy j ∈ {O, T, U} are calculated as follows:
πHTM (w) = (w − cH) (γ(1− v∗H) + (1− γ)(1− v∗L)) , (S.9)
πLTM (w) = (w − cL) (γ(1− v∗L) + (1− γ)(1− v∗H)) ,
πHOM (w) = (1− v∗H)(w − cH),
πLOM (w) = (1− v∗H)(w − cL),
πHUM (w) = (1− v∗L)(w − cH),
πLUM (w) = (1− v∗L)(w − cL),
where v∗i ≡ vi(p∗i (w)).
Plugging in the indifferent consumer locations from Equation (4) and the retail price functions
from (A.4) into the profit functions above, and then solving the FOCs with respect to wholesale
prices yield:
wHT =
cH
2
+
(1− γ)γr2 + 1− r
2(1− r (2γ2 − 2γ + 1))
, (S.10)
wLT =
cL
2
+
1− r + r2(1− γ)γ
2− 4γr(1− γ)
,
wHO =
1
2
(cH − (1− γ)r + 1),
wLO =
1
2
(cL − (1− γ)r + 1),
wHU =
1
2
(cH − γr + 1),
wLU =
1
2
(cL − γr + 1),
where wij denotes the best response price function for the manufacturer when qM = i ∈ {L,H} to
the retailer’s strategy j ∈ {O, T, U}.
Now it is easy to see that if the manufacturer expects the retailer to follow strategy (O) or
(U) then he would not choose to produce a high-quality product. Indeed, substituting these prices
into manufacturer’s profit functions given by (S.9) shows that πLO
∗
M > π
HO∗
M and π
LU∗
M > π
HU∗
M
for any (γ, r), where πij
∗
M stands for optimal manufacturer’s profit in equilibrium outcome (i, j) :
3
πij
∗
M ≡ π
ij
M (w
ij). The manufacturer would only produce a high-quality product if the retailer follows
strategy (T ) in equilibrium.
Finally, solving πHT
∗
M = π
LT ∗
M for cH results in the threshold c
T .
To finish the derivation of equilibrium outcomes, substitute wholesale prices wij defined by
Equations (S.10) into τL(w) and τH(w) defined by Equations (S.6) to obtain the following thresh-
olds:
τLO ≡ τL(wLO) =
(2γ − 1)
(
γ
(
16γ3 − 32γ2 + 17γ − 1
)
r2 +
(
16γ2 − 16γ + 1
)
r + 3
)
16(1− γ)(1− 2(1− γ)γr)2
, (S.11)
τLT ≡ τL(wLT ) =
(2γ − 1)((5γ − 4)r + 3)
16(1− γ)((γ − 1)r + 1)
,
τHT ≡ τL(wHT ) =
(2γ − 1)
(
−(cH(2(1−γ)γr−r+1)+(1−γ)γr
2−r+1)
2
4(−2γ2r+2γr−r+1)2 + (1− γ)γr
2 − r + 1
)
4(1− γ)((γ − 1)r + 1)(1− γr)
,
τHTH ≡ τH(wHT ) = τHT
γ
(1− γ)
,
τLTH ≡ τH(wLT ) = τLT
γ
(1− γ)
,
τLUH ≡ τH(wLU ) =
(2γ − 1)
(
γ
(
16γ3 − 32γ2 + 17γ − 1
)
r2 +
(
16γ2 − 16γ + 1
)
r + 3
)
16γ(1− 2(1− γ)γr)2
.
These thresholds determine which strategy the retailer would follow given a certain reputation
cost τ and wholesale price w. Combining them with the threshold cT that determines which strategy
manufacturer would follow given a certain production cost cH , one can obtain the following set of
pure strategy equilibrium outcomes depicted in Figure 2:
(L,O): Manufacturer produces a low-quality product (qM = L) and sells it to the retailer at the
price wLO. The retailer follows overselling strategy, i.e., sends signal qR = H regardless of
her opinion on product quality qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ < τ
LO.
(H,T): Manufacturer produces a high-quality product (qM = H) and sells it to the retailer at the
price wHT . The retailer follows truthful strategy, i.e., sends quality signal that matches her
opinion about the product quality: qR = qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ ∈
(
τHT , τHTH
)
and cH < c
T .
(L,T): Manufacturer produces a high-quality product (qM = H) and sells it to the retailer at the
price wHT . The retailer follows truthful strategy, i.e., sends quality signal that matches her
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opinion about the product quality: qR = qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ ∈
(
τLT , τLTH
)
and cH > c
T .
(L,U): Manufacturer produces a low-quality product (qM = L) and sells it to the retailer at the price
wLU . The retailer follows underselling strategy, i.e., sends signal qR = L regardless of her
quality opinion qt. This outcome is equilibrium if if τ > τ
LU
H .
Notice that τLO < τLT , τHT < τLT < τLU , which means the combined set of equilibria
conditions listed above does not cover the full parameter space (τ, cH). There is no pure strategy
equilibrium for any pair (τ, cH) which does not satisfy any of the equilibrium conditions listed
above.
Equilibrium Outcomes in a Dual Retailer Environment.
Equating the expected utilities provided by Equation (8) to zero and solving for v provides the
location of consumer indifferent between buying and not buying:
vHH(p) =
p
1− r (1−γ)
2
(1−γ)2+γ2
, if qR1 = qR2 = H
vLL(p) =
p
1− r γ2
(1−γ)2+γ2
, if qR1 = qR2 = L
vHL(p) =
p
1− r2
, if qR1 = H and qR2 = L or qR2 = H and qR1 = L.
We assume that the retailers are symmetrical, thus they set the same price when they send the
same signal. Suppose one retailer forms opinion qt = H (qt = L) upon product examination. The
probability that the other retailer has the same opinion is (1− γ)2 + γ2. The probability that the
other retailer has arrived to a different opinion upon product examination is 2γ (1− γ). If both
retailers follow strategy (T )12, then each retailer’s expected profit, conditional on signal qt observed,
is as follows:
πHTRD (p) =
(
γ2 + (1− γ)2
) (p− w)(1− vHH(p))− (1− γ)rτ
2
+ 2γ(1− γ)× 0, if qt = H,
πLTRD(p) =
(
γ2 + (1− γ)2
) (p− w)(1− vLL(p))
2
+ 2γ(1− γ)(p− w)(1− v∗HL), if qt = L.
Notice that if the retailers have different opinion about product quality, they will send different
signals to consumers when following truthful strategy. And the retailer who sends the high quality
12The retailers are symmetric, hence they follow the same strategy given the same parameter values
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signal would set its price high, only to find no demand because all consumers will buy from the
retailer with the low price.
If retailers follow strategy (O) then each retailer’s expected profit conditional on opinion qt is
πLORD(p) =
(p− w)(1− vHH(p))− γrτ
2
, if qt = L,
πHORD (p) =
(p− w)(1− vHH(p))− (1− γ)rτ
2
, if qt = H.
Finally, if retailers follow strategy (U) then each retailers’ expected profit is
πURD(p) =
(p− w)(1− vLL(p))
2
.
By solving the first order conditions we obtain optimal retail prices as follows:
p∗HD(w) =
w + 1
2
− r
4
+
(2γ − 1)r
4 (2γ2 − 2γ + 1)
, (S.12)
p∗LD(w) =
w + 1
2
− r
4
− (2γ(2− γ(3− 2γ))− 1)(2− r)r
4 (2− 8(1− γ)2γ2 + (4γ (γ3 − 2γ + 1)− 1) r)
,
p∗UD(w) =
w + 1
2
− r
4
− (2γ − 1)r
4 (2γ2 − 2γ + 1)
,
where p∗HD(w) and p
∗
LD
(w) are the prices retailers charge when they send a high or low quality
signal to consumers respectively (under either T or O) strategy. And p∗UD(w) is the price they
charge when they follow strategy U . Substituting these retail prices into the profit functions and
solving for πLURD(w) = π
LT
RD
(w) for τ to find τLD(w), and π
U
RD
(w) = πLTRD(w) for τ to find τHD(w),
we find that the retailers:
• Follow strategy (O) if τ < τLD(w);
• Follow strategy (T ) if τ ∈ (τLD(w), τHD(w));
• Follow strategy (U) if τ > τHD(w),
where
τLD(w) =
2
γr
(
−(γ
2(r2+8(r+1)w+2r−8)−2γ4(r−2)(r+2w−2)+2γ3((r−6)r−8w+8)−4γrw+(r−2)(w−1))
2
8(r−2)(γ(γ(r−2)+2)−1)(−8(γ−1)2γ2+(4γ(γ3−2γ+1)−1)r+2) −
((γ−1)2r+(2(γ−1)γ+1)(w−1))
2
8(2(γ−1)γ+1)(−2γ(γ−1)+(γ−1)2r−1)
)
,
τHD(w) =
(γ2(r+2w−2)−2γ(w−1)+w−1)
2
(2(γ−1)γ+1)(γ(γ(r−2)+2)−1) −
((1−γ)2r+(2(γ−1)γ+1)(w−1))
2
−2γ(γ−1)+(γ−1)2r−1
4r(1− γ)(1− 2(1− γ)γ)
.
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Next we consider the manufacturer’s expected profits:
πHTMD(w) = (w − cH)
(
γ2(1− vHH(p∗HD)) + (1− γ)
2(1− vLL(p∗LD)) + 2γ(1− γ)(1− vHL(p
∗
HD
))
)
,
πLTMD(w) = (w − cL)
(
γ2(1− vLL(p∗LD)) + (1− γ)
2(1− vHH(p∗HD)) + 2γ(1− γ)(1− vHL(p
∗
HD
))
)
,
πHOMD(w) = (w − cH)(1− vHH(p
∗
HD
)),
πLOMD(w) = (w − cL)(1− vHH(p
∗
HD
)),
πHUMD(w) = (w − cH)(1− vLL(p
∗
UD
)),
πLUMD(w) = (w − cL)(1− vLL(p
∗
UD
)),
where πijMD(w) is manufacturer’s expected profit if he produces product of quality i ∈ {H,L}, sets
wholesale price w, and expects retailer to follow strategy j ∈ {O, T, U}.
The following wholesale prices maximize manufacturer’s profit in each case:13
wHTD =
cH
2
+
(2−r)(−2γ(1−γ)+(1−γ)2(−r)+1)(1−γ(2−γ(2−r)))(−8(1−γ)2γ2−(1−2(1−γ)γ(3−2(3−γ)γ))r+2)
2(2(1−2(1−γ)γ)2+(1−2(1−γ)γ(3−5(1−γ)γ))r2−(1−2(1−γ)γ)(3−8(1−γ)γ)r)(−8(1−γ)2γ2−(1−4γ(γ3−2γ+1))r+2)
(S.13)
wLTD =
(2−r)(2γ(1−γ)+(1−γ)2r−1)(γ(2−γ(2−r))−1)(−8(1−γ)2γ2+(2γ(6γ3−8γ2+γ+1)−1)r+2)
2(2(2(γ−1)γ+1)2+2(1−γ)2γ2r2+(−2(γ−1)γ−1)r)(−8(1−γ)2γ2+(4γ(γ3−2γ+1)−1)r+2) ,
wLOD =
1
2
− (1− γ)
2r
2(2γ(γ − 1) + 1)
,
wHOD = w
LO
D +
cH
2
,
wLUD =
1
2
− γ
2r
2 (2γ(γ − 1) + 1)
,
wHUD = w
LU
D +
cH
2
.
Define πij
∗
MD
≡ πijMD(w
ij). As in the single retailer case, it is easy to see that manufacturer would
not produce a high-quality product if retailer follows (U) or (O) strategy, because
πHU
∗
MD
< πLU
∗
MD
,
πHO∗MD < π
LO∗
MD
.
Further, solve πHT
∗
MD
= πLT
∗
MD
for cH : Equation π
HT ∗
MD
−πLT ∗MD = 0 is quadratic in cH with positive
quadratic coefficient. Denote roots of this equation as c1 and c2 where c1 < c2. It is easy to see
that c1 > 0 and that π
HT ∗
MD
is not feasible for cH > c2. Hence π
HT ∗
MD
> πLT
∗
MD
⇐⇒ cH < c1. Denote
13We continue with assumption cL = 0 as in the exclusive retailer case.
7
cTD ≡ c1. Here
c
T
D =
4(2(1−γ)γ+1)(1−2γ(1−γ))3+(1−γ)2γ2
(
4γ4−16γ3+18γ2−6γ+1
)
r4+
(
−16γ8+112γ7−292γ6+396γ5−320γ4+164γ3−54γ2+10γ−1
)
r3+(1−2γ(1−γ))
(
−48γ5+140γ4−160γ3+96γ2−28γ+5
)
r2−4(1−2γ(1−γ))2(γ+1)
(
−4γ3+8γ2−5γ+2
)
r
4(2(1−γ)γ+1)(1−2γ(1−γ))3−
(
−4γ4+8γ2−4γ+1
)(
10γ4−20γ3+16γ2−6γ+1
)
r3+(1−2γ(1−γ))
(
−72γ6+152γ5−72γ4−48γ3+68γ2−28γ+5
)
r2−4(1−2γ(1−γ))2
(
−10γ4+16γ3−3γ2−3γ+2
)
r
−
(2−r)
(
−2γ(1−γ)+(1−γ)2(−r)+1
)(
−2γ+γ2(2−r)+1
)(
−8γ4+8(2γ−1)γ2+
(
−4(4−3γ)γ3+2(γ+1)γ−1
)
r+2
)
(
−8γ4+8(2γ−1)γ2+
(
4γ4−8γ2+4γ−1
)
r+2
)√(
2
(
2γ2−2γ+1
)2
+2(1−γ)2γ2r2+
(
−2γ2+2γ−1
)
r
)(
2
(
2γ2−2γ+1
)2
+
(
10γ4−20γ3+16γ2−6γ+1
)
r2+
(
−16γ4+32γ3−30γ2+14γ−3
)
r
) (S.14)
With τLD(w), τHD(w), w
ij
D, and c
T
D defined above we can list the pure strategy equilibria in the
dual-retailer channel environment:
(L,O): Manufacturer produces a low-quality product (qM = L) and sells it to the retailer at the price
wLOD . The retailer chooses overselling strategy, i.e. sends signal qR = H regardless of the
received signal qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ < τ
LO
D .
(H,T): Manufacturer produces a high-quality product (qM = H) and sells it to the retailer at the
price wHTD . The retailer chooses truthful strategy, i.e. sends quality signal that matches signal
she has received: qR = qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ ∈
(
τHTD , τ
HT
HD
)
and cH < c
T
D.
(L,T): Manufacturer produces a high-quality product (qM = H) and sells it to the retailer at the
price wHTD . The retailer chooses truthful strategy, i.e. sends quality signal that matches signal
she has received: qR = qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ ∈
(
τLTD , τ
LT
HD
)
and cH > c
T
D.
(L,U): Manufacturer produces a low-quality product (qM = L) and sells it to the retailer at the price
wLUD . The retailer chooses underselling strategy, i.e. sends signal qR = L regardless of the
received signal qt. This outcome is equilibrium if τ > τ
LU
HD
.
where τ ijD ≡ τLD(w
ij
D) and τ
ij
HD
≡ τHD(w
ij
D).
Equilibrium Outcomes in the Model With Shared Reputation Damage:
The equilibrium outcomes for the case where reputation damage is shared between retailer and
manufacturer are derived in backward induction fashion analogous to the benchmark model. Here
are the outcomes for each of the stages:
Optimal retail prices:
pHS (w) =
1
2
(1− (1− γ)r + w) if qR = H,
pLS(w) =
1
2
(1− γr + w) if qR = L.
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Reputation cost thresholds:
τLS (w) =
(2γ − 1)
(
(1− γ)γr2 − r − w2 + 1
)
4γλ(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
,
τHS (w) = τLS (w)
γ
1− γ
.
Optimal wholesale prices:
wHTS =
1
4
(2cH + r) +
r2 − 3r + 2
4(2(1− γ)γr − r + 1)
,
wLTS =
2− r
4(1− 2γ(1− γ)r)
− r
4
,
wHOS =
1
2
(cH − r + 1) +
γr
2
,
wLOS =
γr
2
+
1− r
2
,
wHUS =
cH + 1
2
− γr
2
,
wLUS =
1
2
− γr
2
.
Manufacturer’s profits in each equilibrium outcome
πHT
∗
MS
=
(
1− cH(2(1− γ)γr − r) + (1− γ)γr2 − r + 1
)2
8(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)(2(1− γ)γr − r + 1)
,
πLT
∗
MS
=
(1− γ)γr2 − r + 1
8 (2γ2r − 2γr + 1)
− (1− γ)(1− λ)rτ,
πHO
∗
MS
=
(1− cH − (1− γ)r)2
8(1− (1− γ)r)
,
πLO
∗
MS
=
1
8
(1− (1− γ)r)− (1− λ)rτ,
πHU
∗
MS
=
(1− cH − γr)2
8(1− γr)
,
πLU
∗
MS
=
1
8
− γr
8
.
First, notice that πLU
∗
MS
> πHU
∗
MS
for all feasible parameter values: i.e., it is never optimal
for the manufacturer to produce high-quality product in response to retailer following underselling
strategy, hence (H,U) is never an equilibrium. The other five outcomes can be equilibrium outcomes,
depending on τ and cH .
To determine thresholds in terms of τ that define retailer’s choice of product quality represen-
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tation strategy (O,T,U) substitute optimal wholesale prices into τHS and τLS :
τHOS =
(2γ − 1)
(
−c2H − 2γ(cH + 1)r − 2(1− cH)r − 2cH − 5γ2r2 + 6γr2 − r2 + 3
)
16γλ(1− γr)(γr − r + 1)
,
τLOS =
(2γ − 1)(−5γr + r + 3)
16γλ(1− γr)
,
τHTS =
(2γ − 1)
(
−(cH(2γ
2r−2γr+r−1)+(γ−1)γr2+r−1)
2
4(2γ2r−2γr+r−1)2 + (1− γ)γr
2 − r + 1
)
4γλ(1− (1− γ)r)(1− γr)
,
τHTHS =
(2γ − 1)
(
−(γ
2r(2cH+r)−γr(2cH+r)+(cH+1)(r−1))
2
4((2(γ−1)γ+1)r−1)2 + (1− γ)γr
2 − r + 1
)
4(1− γ)λ((γ − 1)r + 1)(1− γr)
,
τLTS =
(2γ − 1)
(
16γ4r2 − 32γ3r2 + 17γ2r2 − γr2 + 16γ2r − 16γr + r + 3
)
16γλ (2γ2r − 2γr + 1)2
,
τLTHS =
(2γ − 1)
(
17γ2r2 − γr2 − 16γr
(
2γ2 − γ − rγ3 + 1
)
+ r + 3
)
16(1− γ)λ(1− 2γ(1− γ)r)2
,
τLUHS =
(2γ − 1)(5γr − 4r + 3)
16(1− γ)λ(1− (1− γ)r)
.
To determine thresholds in terms of cH that define manufacturer’s choice of product quality H
or L, solve πHT
∗
MS
= πLT
∗
MS
= for cH to obtain
cTS =
(1− γ)γr2 − r + 1
2(1− γ)γr − r + 1
−
√
((2γ(1−γ)−1)r+1)(2(1−γ)2γ2r3−3(1−γ)γr2+(2(1−γ)γ+1)r−1)((γ−1)γr2(16(1−γ)(1−λ)τ+1)+r(8(1−γ)(1−λ)τ+1)−1)
(2γ2r−2γr+1)(2(1−γ)γr−r+1)
and solve πHO
∗
MS
= πLO
∗
MS
= for cH to obtain
cOS = 1 + r(1− γ)−
√
(1− (1− γ)r)(1− r(−γ + 8(1− λ)τ + 1))
Equilibrium Outcomes in Case of Skeptical Consumers:
The equilibrium outcomes for the case of skeptical consumers are derived in backward induction
fashion analogous to the benchmark model. Here are the outcomes for each of the stages: Optimal
retail prices:
pHsc(w) =
1 + w
2
− (1− γφ)r
2(2− φ)
,
pLsc(w) =
1
2
(1− γr + w).
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Reputation damage thresholds:
τLsc(w) =
2γ − 1
4γ(2− φ)
− (2γ − 1)w
2
4γ(1− γr)(−φ(1− γr)− r + 2)
,
τHsc(w) = τLsc(w)
γ
1− γ
.
Optimal wholesale prices:
wHTsc =
1
2
(cH − γr + 1) +
2γ2(1− γ)r − γr(1− γr)
2(−γr(2γ − φ) + (1− γ)(−r)− φ+ 2)
,
wLTsc =
(
2γ2 − 3γ + 1
)
r(γr − 1)
2γr(2γ + φ− 3)− 2φ+ 4
+
1
2
(1− γr),
wHOsc =
1
2
(cH − γr + 1) +
(2γ − 1)r
2(2− φ)
,
wLOsc =
(2γ − 1)r
2(2− φ)
+
1
2
(1− γr),
wHUsc =
1
2
(1 + cH − γr),
wLUsc =
1
2
(1− γr).
Manufacturer’s profits in each outcome
πHT
∗
Msc =
(cH(r(γ(−2γ + φ+ 1)− 1)− φ+ 2) + (γr − 1)(r(γφ− 1)− φ+ 2))2
8(1− γr)(r(γφ− 1)− φ+ 2) (−r (2γ2 − γ(φ+ 1) + 1)− φ+ 2)
,
πLT
∗
Msc =
(1− γr)(−r(1− γφ)− φ+ 2)
8(γ(−r)(−2γ − φ+ 3)− φ+ 2)
,
πHO
∗
Msc =
(φ(cH + γr) + 2(1− cH)− r − φ)2
8(2− φ)(r(γφ− 1)− φ+ 2)
,
πLO
∗
Msc =
−φ(1− γr)− r + 2
8(2− φ)
,
πHU
∗
Msc =
(1− cH − γr)2
8(1− γr)
,
πLU
∗
Msc =
1
8
(1− γr).
First, notice that πLU
∗
Msc
> πHU
∗
Msc
and πLO
∗
Msc
> πHO
∗
Msc
for all feasible parameter values: i.e., it is
never optimal for the manufacturer to produce a high-quality product in response to the retailer
following underselling or overselling strategy, hence neither (H,U) nor (H,O) rises in equilibrium.
The other four outcomes can be equilibrium outcomes, depending on τ and cH .
To determine thresholds in terms of τ that define retailer’s choice of product quality represen-
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tation strategy (O,T,U) substitute optimal wholesale prices into τHS and τLS :
τLOsc =
3(2γ − 1)
16γ(2− φ)
− (2γ − 1)
2r
16γ(2− φ)2(1− γr)
,
τHTsc =
(2γ − 1)
(
4
2−φ −
c2H
2−φ+(1−γr)(−r(1−γφ)) −
2cH
2−φ−r(1−γ(1−2γ+φ)) +
(1−γr)(2−φ−r(1−γφ))
(2−φ−r(γ(2γ−φ−1)+1))2
)
16γ
,
τHTHsc = τ
HT
sc
γ
1− γ
,
τLTsc =
2γ − 1
4γ(2− φ)
−
(1− γr)
(
4(2− γ)γ2r − 5γr + r
)
16γ(2− φ− rγ(3− 2γ − φ))2
− (2γ − 1)(1− γr)
16γ(2− φ− rγ(3− 2γ − φ))
,
τLTHsc = τ
LT
sc
γ
1− γ
,
τLUHsc =
2γ − 1
4(1− γ)(2− φ)
− (2γ − 1)(1− γr)
16(1− γ)(2− r − φ(1− γr))
.
To determine thresholds in terms of cH that define manufacturer’s choice of product quality H
or L, solve πHT
∗
MS
= πLT
∗
MS
= for cH to obtain
cTsc =
2− φ− r(1− γr)(1− γφ))
2− φ+ r(1− γ(1− 2γ + φ))
−
(1− γr)(r(γφ− 1)− φ+ 2)
√
(2− rγ(3− 2γ − φ)− φ)(2− φ+ r(γ(1− 2γ + φ)− 1))
(2− φ− rγ(3− 2γ − φ))(2− φ− r(1− γ(1− 2γ + φ)))
.
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